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David C. Gray*
Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of 
other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members 
of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent. 
 
—Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 1
The proper role of international law in domestic constitutional adjudication is a hot issue in 
legal circles and beyond,2 particularly in light of attacks on an “activist” judiciary presently the fad 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law; Associate, Williams & Connolly LLP.  J.D., New York 
University School of Law, 2003; Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2004.  The author wishes to thank the Hon. Chester 
J. Straub for being an inspiring interlocutor, and Christopher Anderson, Katharine Bartlett, Stuart Benjamin, James 
Boyle, Erwin Chemerinsky, Doriane Coleman, Ronald Dworkin, Barry Friedman, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Kraut, 
Travis LeBlanc, William Marshall, Thomas McCarthy, and Jedediah Purdy variously for support and commentary at 
different stages of this project.  This essay is the first in a series of essays and articles investigating the intersections 
between international law, domestic law, and morality, which reframe contemporary and classic jurisprudential 
problems as epistemological challenges with overlapping subjective and intersubjective dimensions. 
1 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217, 1225-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).  Justice 
Thomas has expressed similar sentiments.  See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in denial of certiorari).  A full discussion of Justice Thomas’s views is reserved for later contributions to this series. 
2 Id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) and 1217, 1225-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 
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dissenting); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Printz v. 
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of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 357 (2005); Ruth Bader-Ginsburg, Keynote Address: A Decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 
351 (2005) (“Ginsburg ASIL Address”); Vincent J. Samar, Justifying the Use of International Human Rights Principles in 
American Constitutional Law, 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2005); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign 
Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1893, 1907-08 (2005); Roger Alford, 
In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 639 (2005); Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: 
Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc 305 (2004) (“Scalia ASIL Address”); Patricia M. 
Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 441-42 (2004); 
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Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 265 (2003) (“Breyer ASIL Address”); Roger Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the 
Continuum of Deference, 43 Va. J. of Int’l L. 675, 793 (2003); Mattias Kumm, International Law in National Courts: The 
International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 19 (2003).; Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Keynote Address, 96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 348, 349-50 (2002) (“O’Connor ASIL Address”), David Fontana, Refined 
Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 539, 551 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address, American 
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2among pundits, politicians,3 and pulpitarians.4 While the debate has been slow-roasting for decades 
in judicial and academic circles, the top blew off the pot during the 2003 and 2004 Supreme Court 
terms “[w]hen [Justice] Kennedy, who is hardly liberal, started citing these international sources 
[and] the subject exploded in the broader political world.”5
It is no surprise to his fans or critics that Justice Antonin Scalia has been at the front of the 
contest over use of foreign sources.  In written decisions,6 public speeches,7 and an unprecedented 
debate on the topic with Justice Breyer,8 Justice Scalia has drummed a regular beat against the use of 
contemporary foreign law materials when interpreting the United States Constitution.9 This essay 
provides a critical exegesis of his position and argues that in a narrow field of constitutional cases, 
 
Constitutional Law, The Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions: A Conversation Between Justice Breyer and Justice 
Scalia, January 13, 2005 (complete video available at www.cspan.org, complete transcript available at 
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/0/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument) (“Scalia-
Breyer Debate”); Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42. 
3 See, e.g., H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004) (“Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor any lower Federal 
court shall, in the purported exercise of judicial power to interpret and apply the Constitution of the United States, 
employ the Constitution, laws, administrative rules, executive orders, directives, policies, or judicial decisions of any 
international organization or foreign state, except for the English constitutional and common law or other sources of 
law relied upon by the Framers of the Constitution of the United States.”); H.R. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (“[I]t is the 
sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United 
States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless 
such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of laws passed by the 
elected legislative branches of the United States or otherwise inform an understanding of the original meaning of the 
laws of the United States.”); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2323, 108th Cong. (2004). 
4 Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, supra note 2 at 42. 
5 Toobin, Swing Shift, supra at note 2 at 43 (quoting Norman Dorsen). 
6 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 at 1225-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-
48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
7 Scalia, ASIL Address, supra note 2; Scalia, AEI Address, supra note 2. 
8 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2. 
9 Justice Scalia is neither the only opponent to the use of contemporary international law in constitutional cases on the 
Court nor the only originalist among the nine.  Justice Thomas in particular has expressed his opposition on originalist 
grounds.  See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, supra note 2 at 990.  Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2844 (2006) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas’s views will be addressed at greater lengths in later essays in this series.  While 
they have yet to address the issue head on, one suspects that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will also fall closer 
to Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas than to other members of the Court on this question.  The author waits with the 
crowd for further word.  
3including those implicating the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, Justice Scalia, as an originalist, ought to refer to contemporary foreign sources.   
The first two sections of the essay outline positions adopted by other members of the Court 
in favor of constitutional comparativism.  With this frame drawn, the next section elaborates Justice 
Scalia’s commitment to originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation and explains his 
opposition to the use of contemporary foreign materials when interpreting the United States 
Constitution.  The section also responds to some of Justice Scalia’s more prominent critics, arguing 
that their attacks misunderstand the fundamentals of Justice Scalia’s view and, therefore, fail to 
provide argumentative clash.  The third section of the essay adopts a novel approach, taking a 
position within originalism and arguing that, on pains of contradiction, originalists must take into 
account contemporary views, foreign and domestic, in a limited set of constitutional cases where the 
meaning of the document’s universalist language is at stake.  The fourth section returns to the task 
of sympathetic exegesis, arguing that Justice Scalia’s steadfast refusal to consider foreign sources is a 
practical response to an apparently insurmountable epistemic challenge.  The final section provides a 
schematic solution to this epistemic challenge and indicates the proper role for international law in a 
complete theory of constitutional interpretation.10 
The “Living” Roots of Constitutional Comparativism
The best place to start is with a visit to the opposing camp.  At least four present Justices of 
the Supreme Court, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and the recently retired Justice 
O’Connor, are active proponents of what David Fontana calls “positive” “ahistorical 
 
10 Because the goals of this essay are fundamentally critical, it provides only an outline of a positive theory of 
constitutional comparativism.  The full picture is elaborated in David Gray, “The Proper Care and Feeding of 
International Law: An Epistemic Role for International Law in Constitutional Interpretation,” August 15, 2006, 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
4comparativism.”11 Their views spring from the premise that interpreting the Constitution is not an 
exclusively historical enterprise.  In a recent speech before the American Society of International 
Law, Justice Ginsburg stated the point thus: 
The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United States in grappling with hard 
questions has a close kinship to the view of the U.S. Constitution as a document essentially frozen in 
time as of the date of its ratification.  I am not a partisan of that view.  U.S. jurists honor the Framers’ 
intent to “create a more perfect Union,” I believe, if they read our Constitution as belonging to a 
global 21st century, not as fixed forever by 18th century understandings.12 
The contest that Justice Ginsburg identifies is at the core of debates between originalists and 
advocates of a “living Constitution.”13 
The contemporary stink over the use of foreign sources in constitutional adjudication is 
most directly attributable to Justice Kennedy14 and his opinions in Lawrence v. Texas15 and Roper v. 
Simmons.16 While Justice Kennedy has not separately published his views on the proper place of 
foreign materials in domestic constitutional jurisprudence, these two decisions paint a vivid picture 
of the Constitution as containing objective normative standards that cannot be understood in the 
absence of contemporary events and circumstances.  Given this view, Justice Kennedy is committed 
to considering foreign sources where doing so enhances the capacity of the Court to determine the 
 
11 David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 551 (2001). 
12 Ginsburg ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 355; see also Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 at 1205 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
concurring with Ginsburg, J.) (rejecting the view that “the meaning of the Eighth Amendment had been frozen in 
when it was originally drafted”); id. at 1206-07 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It is by now beyond serious dispute that 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ is not a static command.  Its mandate would 
be little more than a dead letter today if it barred only those sanctions—like the execution of children under the age of 
seven—that civilized society had already repudiated in 1791.”). 
13 Etymologically and historically the idea that the Constitution is a living entity traces directly to Justice Holmes’s 
opinion in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (U.S. 1920) (“when we are dealing with words that also are a 
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the 
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for 
them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much 
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole 
experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.”). 
14 Swing Shift, supra note 2. 
15 539 U.S. 558, 562-579 (2003). 
16 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1187-1204 (2005). 
5scope of objective constitutional standards or to put into perspective normative commitments held 
by our forbears, ancient and recent.   
While neither Lawrence nor Roper express any concern for what foreign nations may think of 
United States courts, Justice Kennedy has elsewhere indicated that international reputation may 
provide a reason for domestic courts to refer to foreign materials in domestic constitutional 
litigation.17 Decisions of United States courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, frequently are 
cited by foreign courts.18 If domestic courts fail to reciprocate when it is relevant, then the United 
States risks losing its voice on issues of international concern and suffers a diminishment in 
international standing for its diffidence.  In light of this, Justice Kennedy has voiced the view that 
domestic courts ought to cite foreign courts when relevant, both in order to preserve our position in 
the international community on questions of international significance and as a matter of 
reciprocity.19 
A signatory to the majority opinions in Lawrence and Roper, Justice Breyer is, perhaps, the 
most publicly vocal advocate on the Court for some form of constitutional comparativism.  Justice 
Breyer described his position most recently in a 2005 debate with Justice Scalia hosted by the United 
States Association of Constitutional Law.20 There he emphasized that the potential relevance of 
foreign materials in domestic cases is derived from two phenomena.  The first is globalization.21 The 
second is the spread of democracy and human rights.22 The intersection of these two has 
internationalized interest in many of the “ancient and unchanging ideals” embedded in the United 
 
17 See Toobin, Swing Shift, supra note 2 at 50 (quoting Justice Kennedy). 
18 O’Connor ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 350. 
19 Toobin, Swing Shift, supra note 2 at 50. 
20 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2. 
21 Id.; see also Breyer ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 265-66.  
22 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2; see also Breyer ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 266. 
6States Constitution.23 As a result, “human beings, called judges” in many countries “have problems 
that often, more and more, are similar to our own.”24 They deal with similar texts and, like domestic 
courts, “are trying to protect human rights . . . and democracy.”  While these cases can never 
provide a perfect analogue to domestic cases, and certainly are not binding,25 Justice Breyer 
maintains that references to foreign materials are frequently relevant as models and sources of data 
when domestic litigation implicates rights or issues of active liberty.26
Though she has left the Court, Justice O’Connor’s views in myriad issues have had broad 
influence and promise to remain significant in domestic constitutional jurisprudence.  Her 
willingness to consider foreign materials is no exception.  Like Justice Breyer’s, globalization also 
plays a central role in Justice O’Connor’s views on the relevance of foreign materials to domestic 
constitutional litigation.  In a 2002 address to the American Society of International Law Justice 
O’Connor argued that the expansion of international law and international treaty regimes combined 
with cross-border commerce and increased accessibility to information has enhanced our “awareness 
of, and access to, peoples and places far different from our own.”27 In light of these conditions, 
domestic decisions may have significant impact beyond country borders.  Domestic judges may also 
“learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the same difficult decisions that 
we face here.”   
 
23 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2.   
24 Id. This idea of parallelism is common in defenses transnational jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Ginsburg ASIL Address, supra 
note 2 at 353; O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, supra 
note 2 at 1907-08; Wald, The Use of International Law, supra note 2 at 441-42 (2004); O’Connor, ASIL Address, supra note 
2 at 349-50. 
25 Knight v. Florida, supra note 2 at 997-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“I believe their views are useful 
even though not binding.”) 
26 I take this phrase from STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005). 
27 O’Connor, ASIL Address, supra note 2. 
7Justice O’Connor restated her commitment to the use of foreign materials in Roper v. 
Simmons.28 Though Justice O’Connor dissented she maintained her view that the use of foreign 
materials is particularly appropriate in Eighth Amendment cases where the Court has a 
“constitutional obligation” to exercise its independent moral judgment29 in order to determine 
whether “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’” place a 
particular punitive practice in the category of the “cruel and unusual.”30 While not compelling or 
determinative of evolving standards of decency, Justice O’Connor holds a place for foreign materials 
to confirm objective indications of domestic standards and the independent moral calculus of the 
Court.31
The Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger held constitutional the University of Michigan 
Law School’s race-sensitive admissions system.  Writing in concurrence, Justice Ginsburg pointed 
out that the Court’s holding “accords with the international understanding of the office of 
affirmative action.” 32 This was not a surprise.  Four years earlier in the Fifty-First Cardozo 
Memorial Lecture,33 Justice Ginsburg argued that domestic jurisprudence touching on issues of 
affirmative action must be read as part of an international dialogue with sovereign states and 
transnational regimes, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,34 the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,35 and the Convention on the Elimination of 
 
28 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1206 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
29 125 S.Ct at 1207, 1209. 
30 Id. at 1207 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). 
31 Id. at 1215-17. 
32 Grutter v. Bollinger, 538 U.S. 306, 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
33 Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999). 
34 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(1948). 
35 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, opened for 
signature Mar. 7, 1966 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
8All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.36 In a 2005 address to the American Society of 
International Law, Justice Ginsburg put this dialogical approach to affirmative action litigation in a 
larger context, describing her view that the Constitution is a document with universal aspirations, 
designed to be sensitive to international and foreign laws that seek the same ends.37 In keeping with 
this view, domestic judges ought to refer to international sources in order to learn from the 
experiences of those on the same path toward justice because “[w]ise parents do not hesitate to learn 
from their children.”38 Of course, “it's important that these things not be binding.”39
Justice Scalia’s Opposition to Constitutional Comparativism
From the opposing camp we proceed to the most contested ground, host to the bloodiest 
battles: the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  The Court’s recent 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been guided by three principles announced in Trop v. Dulles:
that “the words of the Amendment are not precise;” “that their scope is not static;” and that the 
“Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”40 In order to gauge this progress the Court has traditionally surveyed the 
practices of the several states and federal authorities, declaring unconstitutional only those practices 
rejected by a clear domestic consensus.41 In Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the Court 
 
36 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, opened for 
signature Dec. 18, 1979 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). 
37 Justice Ginsburg sees particular significance in the Declaration of Independence’s stated “Respect to the Opinions of 
Mankind.”  See Ginsburg ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 352. 
38 Id. quoting United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
39 Justice Breyer in his 2005 debate with Justice Scalia.  Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2. 
40 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
41 See, e.g., Sanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (failing to find a national consensus “sufficient to label . . . 
cruel and unusual” the death penalty for offenders between the ages of 16 and 18); Penry v. Lynbaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
334 (failing to find national consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, supra note 2 at 
314-16 (finding national consensus against execution of mentally retarded offenders); Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 
at 564-68 (finding national consensus against execution of offenders under the age of eighteen). 
9expanded the scope of its survey, consulting the practices of foreign states and transnational 
institutions to determine the objective decency of executing mentally retarded offenders42 and 
juveniles under the age of eighteen.43 Justice Scalia dissented in each case, both from the result and 
to disclaim the majority’s references to foreign materials.44 In each case, and in subsequent public 
appearances, Justice Scalia has defended that view based on his commitment to originalism.   
There is no more high profile, prolific, elegant, or influential defender of originalism than 
Justice Scalia.45 In his view, originalism is a species of textualism.  Textualists take the view that 
Article III judges have no authority to pursue abstract principles of right or the advancement of 
social justice.  Neither do they have authority to add or detract from the law as it is written.  Rather, 
textualists argue that judges have authority only to interpret and apply the Constitution and 
legislation as it is written.46 As Justice Scalia has pointed out, these limitations are a relative novelty 
in the common law tradition, in which judges traditionally enjoyed a prominent role in defining the 
law.47 
The more limited authority afforded to Article III judges is, in the Justice Scalia’s view, a 
function of the United States’ conversion to republican democracy and the accompanying 
distribution of authority between three distinct branches of government.  In systems where judges 
are representatives of crown or legislature they have derivative authority to, in contemporary 
 
42 Atkins v. Virginia, supra note 2 at 316 n. 21. 
43 Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 at 1198-1200. 
44 Id. at 1217, 1225-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, supra note 2 at 347-48 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
45 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 144 (1997).  Justice Thomas is also a stalwart and 
academically rigorous originalist.  While this essay focuses on Justice Scalia, one cannot ignore the contributions of 
Justice Thomas to the general influence of originalism in the courts and in public discourse.  While many of the 
arguments made here have equal force with respect to Justice Thomas’s views, a full accounting of his position is 
beyond the scope of the present essay and is reserved for later work.   
46 Id at 23-25. 
47 Id. 
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parlance, “make law.”  United States judges, elevated and sequestered as they are, have none.  That 
task is explicitly left to Congress alone by Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution. 
Few have substantial objections to the idea that, as a matter of institutional democratic 
theory, judges should limit themselves to the interpretation and application of the laws48—though 
more than a few argue that it is folly to think that judges can and naïve to think that they do.49 The 
real drama starts when those who might at first regard themselves as textualists are asked what it 
means “to interpret” and “to apply” a text.  Strict constructionists argue that statutes and the 
Constitution should be interpreted literally and without regard to extra-textual considerations.  
Others take a more liberal view, taking account of the purposes of law and the consequences of 
competing interpretations.50 Originalists fall somewhere between these points on the spectrum.   
The hallmark of the originalist is that she seeks, as best she can, to understand what the 
reasonable meaning of the text was at the time it was written.51 Some materials are relevant to this 
endeavor and some are not.  Notable in Justice Scalia’s category of the irrelevant is legislative intent.  
Ours is a system of laws, not men.  To pursue legislative intent rather than interpreting the law as 
written would be to elevate men over the law.  Pursuit of legislative intent may also veil judicial 
legislation.  As a matter of fact, the many legislators who join to pass a law seldom share a single, 
unified intent.  Moreover, the sources most cited as evidence of legislative intent actually reflect the 
opinions of a very few legislators, or sometimes none at all.52 Attempts to find legislative intent 
 
48 See, e.g., BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 26 at 17. 
49 See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, 87-119 (1989); but see RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND 
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988) (arguing that objective meaning of text limits interpretation) and 
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982) (arguing that continuity of interpretive community 
binds limits interpretation). 
50 See, e.g., BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 26 at 17-18. 
51 In his 2005 debate with Justice Breyer, Jusice Scalia put the point thus: “my theory of what I do when I interpret the 
American Constitution is I try to understand what it meant, what was understood by the society to mean when it was 
adopted.”  Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2. 
52 Committee reports come under particularly heavy fire from Justice Scalia.  See A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 45 
at 34-35. 
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therefore impose little actual discipline on judges.  A judge seeking to establish a rule will find ample 
evidence to support the claim that what congress really meant is what the judge thinks it ought to 
have meant.  Of course, if a law, read for what it reasonably means, does not reflect the intentions of 
the legislature, then congress is well-positioned to remedy the situation.  At any rate, it is not for 
judges to diagnose and cure disparities between legislative intent and the objective meaning of the 
text.   
 While Justice Scalia does not regard evidence of legislative intent as relevant to the task of 
interpreting the law, he does not limit himself to the text alone.  As a hermeneutical matter, 
originalists will consider evidence exogenous to the text if it clarifies what the words in a statute 
reasonably meant when the law was passed.53 For example, most legislation, and much of the 
Constitution, addresses particular problems.  Only by understanding these problems can the original 
import and, therefore, the original meaning of the language be fully understood.54 Similarly, the 
reasonable meaning of words of art and technical language incorporated into legal texts may be 
obscure without reference to other sources or events contemporary with the drafting and adoption 
of the text. 
 With this background in mind, there are few surprises in Justice Scalia’s views on the use of 
foreign materials by domestic courts.  Foreign sources are critical when domestic courts are called 
upon to apply foreign law.55 Foreign sources are also relevant, though not dispositive, when 
 
53 While perhaps not Scalia’s view, by an application of lex posterior derogat legi priori an originalist may consider evidence 
that post-dates a statute or section of the Constitution if that evidence is contemporaneous with legislation or a 
constitutional amendment that bears on the meaning of language that appears in the earlier statute or section.  For 
example, considering the meaning of “due process of law” in the Fifth Amendment the originalist need not, and 
perhaps ought not, seek to discover the reasonable meaning of that phrase in 1791, but may expand her search to 
include its meaning in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified with identical language.  Of course, this 
presents some difficulty in understanding the proper date referent for some laws and amendments.  Consider, as an 
extreme example, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.  I am entirely in debt to Bill Van 
Alstyne for illuminating this point for me. 
54 SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 144. 
55 Scalia AEI Address, supra note 2; Scalia ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 305-06. 
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domestic courts must interpret international treaties to which the United States is party.56 In regard 
to interpretations of domestic legislation, courts are entitled to consider foreign sources when the 
law in question provides a specific foothold in international law, such as in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.57 He also recognizes that the experiences of other states may be used in narrow 
circumstances to refute predictions of disaster advanced against a textually accurate holding.58
Beyond these limited cases, Justice Scalia argues that “modern foreign legal materials can never be 
relevant to an interpretation of—to the [original] meaning of—the U.S. Constitution.”59
Emphasis must be placed on “modern,” of course.  Consistent with his views on original 
meaning, Justice Scalia allows that consideration of foreign materials that informed then-
contemporary understandings of constitutional language may aid modern courts to understand the 
original meaning of the text.60 In this regard, Justice Scalia has represented that he “probably use[s] 
more foreign legal materials than anyone else on the Court, with the possible exception of Justice 
Thomas [though o]f course they are all fairly old foreign legal materials, and they are all English.”61 
Consistent with the foregoing, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, famously has opined that 
“comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a Constitution, though it was of 
course quite relevant to the task of writing one.”62 This view has been subjected to various attacks.  
Harold Koh, for example, has argued that Justice Scalia’s “[founding-interpretation] distinction 
 
56 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660-661 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
57 Scalia ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 306 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in property taken in violation 
of international law are in issue . . .”). 
58 Scalia AEI Address, supra note 2; Scalia ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 307. 
59 Scalia ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 307. 
60 Id.; Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2.  In his address to the ASIL, Justice Scalia highlights as an example of this view 
the Court’s opinion in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) where he relies on English sources of law known to 
the framer’s in 1791 that bear on the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 
61 Scalia ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 306; Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2.   
62 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1999); see also Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2. 
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makes no sense,” principally because many constitutions of foreign nations and contemporary 
human rights documents are based on and use language similar to the United States’ Constitution; 
and, therefore, comparative analysis is just as relevant in contemporary interpretation as it was for 
the original founding.63
Such responses ignore the fundamentals of the originalist position and appear to rely on an 
application of the anachronistic fallacy.  Foreign practice was part of the milieu at the founding and 
informed the reasonable meaning of constitutional language at that time.  By definition, 
contemporary comparative materials where not part of the mix.  Therefore, if one accepts the 
originalist’s contention that the beginning and end of contemporary interpretive challenge is to 
divine what the words meant to those who wrote them, then reference to contemporary materials is 
of no moment.64 Further, given the diversity of foreign views on many critical issues, reference to 
contemporary materials, like appeals to legislative intent, threaten to expand without warrant the 
powers of the judiciary.65 
This is not to say that others on and off the court have not advanced compelling reasons to 
doubt the merits of Justice Scalia’s rejection of modern foreign sources.  Most are external to the 
originalist position, however, attacking the claim that interpretation is limited to divining the 
meaning of the text at the time it was written and ratified.  This essay adopts a novel approach, 
advancing an argument for constitutional comparativism internal to Scalian originalism.  Specifically, 
it argues that, on pain of contradiction, Justice Scalia and other devotees of originalism may not limit 
 
63 Harold Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 43, 54 (2004).  Koh and others also smugly suggest 
that the moral views of our progenitors are quaint, at best.  See id. (“Early American law punished not just consensual 
sodomy, but also idolatry, blasphemy, adultery, and witchcraft, all of which were treated as capital crimes”) (citing 
Michael Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in SOCIETY’S FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY 1, 3 (Laura Randa ed., 1997)).  As with most anachronistic critiques, such attacks risk missing the 
point. 
64 Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, supra note 2 at 654-55. 
65 Scalia AEI Address, supra note 2; Scalia ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 308-10; Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2. 
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their interpretive inquiry to ancient materials in cases that implicate the Constitution’s universalist 
language.   
 
An Originalist Argument for Constitutional Comparativism
The United States Constitution is a complicated document that performs multiple tasks.  
Some are historical and constitutive.  It proposes establishment of a country66 and describes the 
formal requirements for ratification of that proposal.67 It is a set of written instructions, providing 
technical details relating to, inter alia, the composition of the legislature68 and the age requirements 
for various offices.69 It is a principled organizational guide, establishing the responsibilities of the 
three branches.70 It is also aspirational, describing the politico-ethical contours of the nation and 
moral limitations on governmental authority and action.71 The language directed to this last purpose 
is notably grand, touching on universal norms of decency and right.72 The Constitution exists to 
“form a more perfect union,” to “establish justice,” ensure “tranquility,” to “promote the general 
welfare,” and “to secure the blessings of liberty.”   No matter its will to the contrary, a legislature 
cannot dictate punishments that are “cruel and unusual.”  Neither can the executive deprive persons 
“of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  These are big ideas; and the constitutional 
language of rights and justice simply cannot be understood apart from the moral valance of the 
 
66 U.S. CONST., pmbl. 
67 Id., art. VII. 
68 Id., art. I, §§ 1-3. 
69 Id., art. I, §§ 2 & 3, art. II, § 1. 
70 Id., art. I-VI. 
71 See, e.g., id., pmbl., amend. V, amend. VIII, amend. XIV, § 1. 
72 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133, 185-86 (1977) (pointing out that the drafters of the constitution 
elected in these sections of the text to inscribe expansive moral limitations on government rather than specific 
technical regulations). 
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words themselves, confirmed by the soaring declarations of the Preamble and concretized in the 
historical events that gave rise to the Constitution, the State, and the Nation.73
There is little doubt that late eighteenth century Americans were moral realists. 74 That is, 
they read portions of the Constitution as picking out objective and timeless moral truths.  In 
particular, building on Blackstone’s Commentaries and the work of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century liberals, the dominant view of our forebears at our founding was that justice and right in the 
world was a function of faith to natural law.  As Justice Scalia has pointed out, there is no textual 
ground on which one can conclude that the Constitution incorporates the whole of natural law.75
Nevertheless, certain passages, such as the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, indisputably attach to objective right.  As an example, and in Justice Scalia’s words, 
“Americans of 1791 surely thought that what was cruel was cruel, regardless of what a more brutal 
future generation might think about it.”76 
Given that the framers and their audience were moral realists it must be admitted that 
“cruel” originally meant to pick out practices that are, and always will be, cruel.  If this is so, then it 
follows that judges charged with enforcing the Eighth Amendment must determine whether state 
conduct falls within the natural category of “cruelty.”  This is not the same as determining what the 
 
73 I invoke the distinction between “state” and “nation” with a purpose.  Nations, as a people, are variously described, see 
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983), but the American Nation is rather unique in that it is 
identified not by ethnicity, religion, or historical geography, but by association with a set of normative commitments 
that provide the narrative structure of our creation myth and are set forth in a handful of founding documents.  
74 See, e.g., SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 146; Phillip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, 
and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1127 (1987); Scalia, AEI Address, supra note 2 (responding to questions from the audience). 
75 Scalia, AEI Address, supra note 2 (responding to questions from the audience); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-63 (1989).  
76 SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 146.  Justice Scalia goes on to suggest that “[the framers] were 
embedding in the Bill of Rights their moral values.”  This conclusion does not follow.  The framers used the objective 
language of “cruelty.”  Each participant in the process of drafting and ratification may have had strong views on the 
content of “cruelty.”  However, from an originalist point of view their particular beliefs are of no consequence.  Then, 
as now, “cruel” meant cruel.  Full faith to originalism requires reading the Eighth Amendment for what it actually 
meant rather than for the subjective beliefs its various contributors and readers might have intended to capture in the 
text.   
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framers and other residents of late eighteenth century America thought was cruel.  While they likely 
had strong views on the subject, for a court to limit its inquiry to their views would give unwarranted 
privilege to eighteenth century moral beliefs.  If the goal is to discover original meaning, and “cruel” 
meant then, as it does now, to pick out an objective moral category, then it is the court’s duty to 
discover the content of that category.  Forgoing this search in favor of an inquiry into what the 
framers intended to capture with “cruel and unusual” either involves a category mistake77 or requires 
a move from originalism to intentionalism.   
A contemporary devotee of moral realism might recognize that the framers were kindred 
spirits but challenge the view that unelected judges ought to engage in moral inquiry when deciding 
Eighth Amendment cases.78 Disagreements among committed moral realists define our times, as 
they have most of modern history.  One might believe that well-ordered societies have a duty to 
resolve correctly these disputes in order to conform their practices to natural law.  It does not 
follow, however, that unelected judges have the authority to make the call.  Rather, given democratic 
commitments to legitimacy and collective will formation, it seems improper for judges to usurp the 
elected branches, which have the political authority to resolve normative contests that arise in 
diverse societies.79 
Whether Platonists or endorsers of Natural Law, then, Americans in 1791 were objectivists, 
who meant to embed in the text of the Constitution a defined set of timeless and objective norms.  
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia claims that these same Americans “were embedding in the Bill of Rights 
their moral values, for otherwise all its general and abstract guarantees would be brought to 
 
77 As is discussed below, the mistake is to confuse the actual content of, for example, “cruelty,” with late eighteenth 
century views on the content of “cruel.” 
78 Scalia, AEI Address, supra note 2 (responding to questions from audience addressing moral and natural law 
foundations of the Constitution). 
79 SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 9-14.  This is a version of the counter-majoritarian dilemma, 
elaborated in Barry Friedman’s work, which stands as a principal challenge to constitutional comparativism.  See, e.g.,
Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, supra  note 2 at 641-45. 
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naught.”80 According to this view, the moral text of the Constitution can only be read to refer to the 
moral opinions of late Eighteenth Century America; the job of judges is to discover those views 
from the text and the record as best they can.  Of course, this conclusion rides on fallacious 
equivocation, presenting originalists with a difficult contradiction.  
Originalists are committed to the view that the text of the Constitution must be interpreted 
to mean what it meant at the time it was written and ratified.  In 1791 the moral language of the 
Constitution meant to refer to objective Right.  “Cruel” picked out a moral category that is “out 
there.”  Yet when asked to interpret and apply the moral language of the Constitution, Justice Scalia 
takes the position that it means only what some of those living in 1791 America believed was right 
or, less powerfully, what the had not rejected as cruel.81 On this view, “cruel” means the category of 
punishments that were regarded as cruel in 1791 and excludes punishments that were then in use.  
These are two different meanings of “cruel.”  One refers to an objective moral category, the other to 
subjective beliefs regarding the content of that category.  To interpret the moral language of the 
Constitution as referring to subjective beliefs about content imposes on the document a brand of 
moral relativism that is not consistent with the fact that some constitutional language had objective 
moral meaning for the framers and their contemporaries. 82 
To see the point more clearly, it is worth considering a brief thought experiment.  Imagine 
for a moment that, out on her habitual constitutional, Mary Mothes, mother, grandmother, wife, and 
 
80 Id. 
81 SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 146; Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 75 at 862-63.  It is worth 
noting that on the matter of lashing, Scalia has acknowledged that “in a crunch[he] may prove to be a faint hearted 
originalist.”  See id. at 864. 
82 Lawrence Lessig makes a similar point in his criticism of “one-step originalism.”  85 GEO. L. REV. 1837, 1840 (1997).  
Lessig rightly criticizes this view for preventing fidelity to constitutional meaning by requiring an antiquarian reading of 
the language that has no footing in contemporary society.  As he points out, originalists charge judges not with fidelity 
to the language of the Constitution but to fidelity to what was meant at the original writing (again, this raises troubling 
epistemic problems that cannot fully be attended to here).  Originalists have an easy response, of course, which is that 
the Constitution includes terms of amendment.  If we want to convert from the original meaning of the language, we 
know how. 
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D.A.R., stumbles across the moral truth poking out of the ground.  Surprisingly light and compact, 
she quickly excavates it and presents it to the proper authorities.  Upon inspection it is discovered 
that, as a matter of moral fact, bastinado is cruel.  Unfortunately, a small but committed group of 
states actively engage the practice as a punishment.  This is not to say that bastinado and other 
forms of corporal punishment are not controversial.  To the contrary, it is, and has been, a source of 
public debate since well before 1791.  In these contests some have argued that bastinado is cruel on 
various grounds, religious, deontological, and social.  Others have maintained that it is not, finding 
religious, philosophical, and sociological support for their views.  A third group, split within itself, 
has remained agnostic on the hard moral question, focusing instead on its costs and benefits.  Each 
of these groups has taken the day at different points and in different states, but the practice has 
persisted, and no clear national consensus has ever been reached. 
Prior to Mary’s discovery, there were periodic Eighth Amendment challenges to the practice 
as well.  None were successful, principally because originalists were able to demonstrate that 
bastinado was widely used in the colonies and England during the late eighteenth century, though 
even then some thought it cruel.  Soon after Mary’s discovery a new round of challenges arrive at 
federal courthouses across the country.  The plaintiffs advance a simple syllogism.  They argue that 
if a punishment is cruel,83 it is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment; that bastinado is cruel; and, by 
an application of modus ponens, the Eighth Amendment prohibits bastinado.  Defenders of 
bastinado admit that there is now no contest as to the actually cruelty of bastinado, but maintain that 
bastinado does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  They do so by attacking the major premise of 
their opponents’ argument.  Specifically, they claim that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit 
punishment that is actually cruel; rather, it prohibits punishment that would reasonably have been 
 
83 The rather more nuanced issue of what punishments are “unusual” is left aside for purposes of elegance with a 
notation that in Eighth Amendment terms is more than a statistical or demographic issue. 
19
regarded as cruel by a significant group of Americans in 1791.  They point out that bastinado was 
widespread in 1791; therefore, by application of a historical version of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, bastinado is not “cruel” in Eighth Amendment terms because a significant group of those 
who read “cruel” in 1791 would not have thought excluded lashing and other corporal punishment.   
Faced with one of these new cases, what is an originalist to do?  It is clear that, on pain of 
contradiction, an originalist must hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibits bastinado.  The 
guiding principle of originalism is that texts should be read for what they meant at drafting and 
adoption.  On its face, and read for its original meaning, the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
punishment that is cruel and unusual.  While Americans in 1791 may have had some ideas about 
what sorts of punishments fill that category, the mind experiment shows that any inquiry into their 
views is not determinative of what actually is cruel or unusual.  Discovering their views does not end 
an Eighth Amendment inquiry.  Put another way, inquiring into then-contemporary beliefs about 
the cruelty of various forms of punishment may reveal what the framers and ratifiers intended to 
prohibit; but that, as Justice Scalia has argued, is not relevant to the judicial task of interpretation 
from an originalist’s point of view.  
 
Originalist as Pragmatist?
While many disagree with Justice Scalia, nobody can accuse him of being soft-headed.  One 
wonders, then, how and why Justice Scalia, who reads the Constitution for what it means and 
recognizes that moral language in the Constitution has objective meaning, would interpret the 
Constitution by attempting to divine the subjective moral dispositions of 1791 Americans.  The 
answer is that Justice Scalia is Odysseus.84 
84 I am in debt to Travis LeBlanc for his lively riff on this theme. 
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In a now famous contribution to the canon, Jon Elster analogizes the Constitution to a 
ship’s mast in Odysseus’s escape from the sirens.85 As his ships approached the Sirenum scopuli, 
Odysseus feared that he and his men would be lured to their destruction by the seductive melodies 
of the sirens’ song.  To save them, he ordered his men to stuff their ears with wax and had himself 
lashed to the mast of his ship so that he could hear their song.  Odysseus was made weak by the 
chorus and begged his men to untie him.  As ordered, however, they left him bound until they made 
safe passage.86
Elster suggests that the Constitution plays a similar role in our democracy.  It sets forth 
“precommitments” that bind us and keep us safe from the temptations that would otherwise cast us 
against the cliffs of history.  Justice Scalia has a similar view, noting that the Constitution’s “whole 
purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations 
cannot readily take them away.  A society that adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that ‘evolving 
standards of decency’ always ‘mark progress,’ and that societies always ‘mature,’ as opposed to rot.”87 
With this in mind, the impact of Justice Scalia’s claim that “Americans of 1791 . . . were embedding 
in the Bill of Rights their moral values, for otherwise all its general and abstract guarantees would be 
brought to naught”88 becomes clear.   
As a matter of fact, there is broad disagreement on moral matters.89 Some disagreements 
reflect individual differences; others derive from cultural, national, or historical views.  Absent some 
objective referent, these disagreements threaten the stabilizing function of the Constitution by 
subjecting critical constitutional language and content to the whims of fashion and history.  Justice 
 
85 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-47 (1979). 
86 HOMER, ODYSSEY XII, 39. 
87 SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 40. 
88 Id. at 146. 
89 But see, JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 23-29 (2d. Ed. 1993) (arguing that there is broad 
agreement on core moral commitments and disagreements occur only at the margins). 
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Scalia’s solution is to bind himself and these “abstract guarantees” to the moral views of the 
founders.  While this is obviously a derogation from the originalist’s commitment to read the 
Constitution for what it means, and may even fail to secure the actual guarantees embedded in the 
moral language of the Constitution, it at least guarantees something. In view of moral disagreements 
and changes in moral views over time, attempts to read the Constitution for its objective content 
may guarantee nothing.  Of course, if future discoveries should prove the founders’ views wrong, 
dysfunctional, or otherwise unworthy, then the content of constitutional guarantees can always be 
changed through the amendment process. 
This last point deserves brief attention.  The same epistemic difficulties that motivate the 
move to historicism also buttress Justice Scalia’s reliance on the elected branches and the 
amendment process.  While those in the robes might think differently, it is Justice Scalia’s view that 
judges are no better situated than others to divine the moral truth behind constitutional language.  
Moreover, they are not elected and they enjoy life tenure, isolating them from the democratic 
process.  Given this, if the moral content of abstract rights is left to judges, constitutional guarantees 
are likely to be both idiosyncratic and unstable.  While the elected branches of the federal 
government and the legislatures of the many states may not be more enlightened, the amendment 
process is sufficiently cumbersome to ensure stability.  Perhaps more importantly, the elected 
branches are democratically accountable, providing hope for legitimacy if not truth.    
Cast in this light, attempts to divine the founders’ views may seem attractive when the moral 
language of the Constitution is implicated.  There are a number of reasons why this may not be so.  
Before getting to that discussion, however, it is worth clarifying two points.  First, Justice Scalia’s 
attempt to interpret the objective moral language of the Constitution by reference to the moral 
views of 1791 Americans is a move away from originalist orthodoxy.  The moral language of the 
Constitution, read in context and for what it meant in 1791 limits government actions according to 
22
the demands of objective right.  While this begs the question of content, no honest reading of the 
text can bind the moral language to the moral ideas of any person or group without an added 
premise connecting their views to the Good.  Second, as the mind experiment demonstrates, the 
move from objective Right to founders’ intent is a practical solution to an epistemic problem.90 If 
the undisputed truth about cruelty, liberty, justice, and due process were discovered tomorrow, then 
there would be no reason to indulge in historicism. 
There is good reason to doubt the utility of historicism as a solution to the problem of 
predictability and stability.  To start, the claim that there was a unified view on moral matters in late 
Eighteenth Century America is dubious at best.  Framers, commentators, citizens, and members of 
ratifying legislatures notoriously were of different minds on many core issues of Right.91 Some of 
the key players were even at odds with themselves.92 This diversity of opinion presents obvious 
problems for the historicist.  First, it renders the archaeological goal of uncovering what was 
regarded as cruel in 1791 difficult, if not impossible, trading one epistemic problem for another.  
Second, even if the historicist move is not strictly an appeal to framers’ intent, the fact of diversity in 
1791 suggests that hopes for stability and predictability may be misplaced.  Originalists oppose 
appeals to legislative intent because the legislative record is sufficiently ambiguous to provide 
support for diverse views and space for judicial legislation.  If the historical record is also 
ambiguous, then to bind judges to moral opinions circulating in 1791 is to bind them to nothing at 
all, opening the door to much-feared judicial legislation.   
 
90 It may be argued that Scalia’s reliance on the elected branches to fill the moral language of the Constitution with 
content via legislation and amendment is epistemological as much as practical.  While such an argument may be made 
convincingly in non-constitutional cases (and, in fact, reflects our assessment of epistemic capacity and assignments of 
decisional responsibilities among the three branches) it has no footing in constitutional cases where the assignments 
shift.  This is a point elaborated at greater length in Gray, “The Care and Feeding of International Law,” supra note 10. 
91 See generally The Federalist No. 54 (James Madison); PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND 
LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (1996), Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the 
Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 424 ff. (1999).  
92 Mr. Jefferson famously wrestled with his own conscience in these matters.  See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in 
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 173, 210 (Koch, et al., eds., 1944). 
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By contrast, diversity of opinion in 1791 bolsters the claim that the moral language of the 
Constitution should be read for its objective meaning.  The Constitution is a product of committee 
work.  As with most committees, the authors and the ratifying states agreed on some matters and 
disagreed on others.  Where the language in the document is definite and concrete there is good 
reason to conclude that the committee agreed.  Consider the Article II, Section 1 requirement that 
no person is eligible to the office of the President without having “attained to the Age of thirty five 
years,” the Third Amendment prohibition on the quartering of troops during peacetime “without 
the consent of the Owner.”  Where the language is more general and abstract, however, one 
suspects persistent disagreement on the details.  Expansive language effects a compromise without 
actually achieving a meeting of the minds by encompassing diverse, and sometimes conflicting, 
views.  In the case of the Constitution, however, grand language that might serve to mask 
disagreements also demonstrates real agreement.  While there was surely some disagreement as to 
what constitutes cruel punishment, all agreed that the Constitution prohibits punishment that is cruel 
and unusual.   
Reliance on the amendment process as a solution to epistemic challenges also raises 
concerns for the stabilizing function of the Constitution.  Take, for example, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  Justice Scalia has argued that no 
punishment is cruel or unusual in constitutional terms unless it was so for late Eighteenth Century 
residents of the colonies.93 Since 1791, views on what is and is not cruel have shifted and many of 
these shifts have gained sufficient footing to achieve the status of moral truth.  On the originalist’s 
 
93 SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 145-47; Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 at 1218 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Scalia cannot be accused of putting his intellectual commitments above his professional duties, 
however.  Despite his belief that it is a “mistaken . . . jurisprudence,” Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1217 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), when writing for the majority Justice Scalia has applied the metric of “evolving standards of decency” 
announced in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).  See Stanford v. Kentucky., 492 U.S. 361, 368 ff. (1989).  Faith to 
theory aside, Justice Scalia has elsewhere admitted that, if faced with a particularly nauseating punitive practice, he 
might be inclined to a more “faint-hearted” originalism, though he doubts that the political branches would ever put 
him in such a position.  See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 75 at 862-64.   
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view, for courts to take notice of these shifts in social conscience requires a constitutional 
convention that would formally do nothing more than restate existing language but, as a 
hermeneutical matter, would change the content of those protections by formally engaging 
contemporary semantic referents.  Returning to the mind experiment, whether relying on Mary 
Mothes’s incredible discovery or the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society”94 a proposed amendment that would allow the judiciary to read the Eighth 
Amendment as prohibiting punishments that are actually cruel would change the language of the 
Eighth Amendment not a wit.  Put another way, in order to make the moral language of the 
Constitution mean what it means, the originalist requires constant constitutional conventions that 
function as recommitment ceremonies.  The goal of these conventions would not be to change the 
text.  Rather, the purpose would be to reaffirm commitment to the same old language.  This is not 
only odd but also threatens the function of the Constitution as a set of precommitments meant to 
offer security against the sirens’ song: those temptations of power, greed, that are fundamental to 
the human condition. 
Interpreting the Constitution through the lens of historical relativism limits its moral content 
to the happenstance dispositions of those present when last it was ratified.  For those more inclined 
to read the Constitution as a “living” document or as bound to objective norms, amendments are 
necessary only to change the language or substance of the Constitution.  To conform constitutional 
language to actual rather than historical right, the originalist requires regular and almost constant 
amendment, even if only to re-ratify the same old language.  Building in this structural requirement 
for frequent constitutional legislation has obvious impact on the Constitution’s capacity to serve as a 
mast in the storm.  Constant exposure to the political process provides a wealth of opportunity to 
change the content, of course, but it also reduces the sacred to the profane.  Much of the authority 
 
94 Trop v. Dulles, supra note 40 at 100-01. 
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of the Constitution as a principled limitation of governmental action depends on its remaining 
immune from the whims of history and the political process.  If its content is limited to momentary 
disposition and is constantly and necessarily subjected to the political process then that authority, 
and its capacity to save us from the shoals, is lost. 
The originalist’s reliance on historical views of right and the amendment process also has 
unattractive consequences for the balance of power between the three branches of government.  
Justice Scalia does not contest the claim that the Constitution has moral content or that in 1791 the 
meaning of the language was to incorporate objective moral content into the text.  His historicism 
and attendant reliance on the amendment process reflects an underlying epistemic problem and a 
determination that, from a democratic point of view, the moral content of the Constitution should 
be determined by the elected branches of government through legislation and amendment.  While 
there may be good epistemological and democratic reasons to rely on electoral and legislative 
processes to determine the objective moral content of the Constitution, to do so would require a 
dramatic shift of constitutional authority from Article III to the Articles I and II.   
The judiciary’s critical constitutional function is to limit the actions of the elected branches 
according to limits set forth in the Constitution.  If authority to determine the content of existing 
constitutional language is exclusively assigned to the elected branches through legislation or constant 
amendment then the judiciary will have abdicated its constitutional role.  Exercise of this Article III 
authority is not without structural limitation, of course.  The amendment process remains as an 
important check on the judiciary’s execution of this duty, and properly so.  However, to rely on the 
amendment process as a source of meaning for the existing text unduly limits the constitutional 
authority of the judiciary, improperly, because constantly, subjects constitutional protections to the 
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vicissitudes of the political process, and puts the judiciary’s capacity to enforce the Constitution at 
the mercy of a the elected branches and the states.  In short, it leaves the wolves to tend the flock.95
How to be an Original Constitutional Comparativist
From the point of view of democratic theory there is little to dispute in the claim that the 
elected branches have authority to resolve contests over policy and collective conceptions of the 
good life and that courts must generally limit themselves to resolving disputes.96 Constitutional 
courts have a unique role, however.  In constitutional democracies these bodies are charged with 
enforcing objective limitations on law and policy according to foundational boundaries enshrined in 
a constitution.97 Objectivity and stability are critical to the exercise of this authority and, as Justice 
Scalia and other originalists have pointed out, resolving constitutional disputes by reference to the 
natural law presents serious epistemic problems.  Judges are not oracles and any attempt by a court 
to reach an earnest view on “cruelty,” for example, risks deteriorating into rank subjectivity.   
Courts that take up this gauntlet must confront their epistemic limitations.  However, if the 
foregoing is right then courts deciding cases that implicate the objective moral content of the 
Constitution must embrace the challenge rather than abdicating to eighteenth century views.  The 
question that remains is how.  One possibility might be to adopt an onto-teleological view of 
constitutional commitments to Right.98 This view takes seriously the Constitution’s intention to 
 
95 By this I do not imply that the elected branches are necessarily vicious predators, though they sometimes are.  In fact, 
each of the three branches has the potential to be wolf and lamb.      
96 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 168-93 (1996). 
97 Id.
98 See, e.g.., Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 2 at 578-79 (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they 
might have been more specific.   They did not presume to have this insight.  They knew times can blind us to certain 
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”) 
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create a “more perfect union” and acknowledges that there is room for improvement.99 Further 
pursuit is left for future generations within the objective boundaries of right described in the text 
and resolution of any particular case relies on “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.” 
While some may take solace in the implied teleology, there is no warrant for a court to find 
the practices of contemporary institutions more humane than those of their predecessors based 
solely on fear of anachronism.100 Further, just as opinions on what constitutes cruelty vary between 
individuals (including judges), they vary over time.  Thus, interpreting “cruelty” through the lens of 
contemporary opinion eliminates the capacity of the Constitution to act as stable check on 
government action.     
Another path might be for judges to exercise their independent judgment.101 While faithful 
to originalism, such a strategy begs the fundamental question of how a mortal judge can avoid 
substituting idiosyncratic opinion for objective moral fact.  In the recent past a majority of the Court 
has sought safe harbor in science.  As examples, in both Atkins and Roper the Court considered 
scientific studies relating to the decisional capacities of the profoundly retarded and the profoundly 
young, and in Brown the Court famously considered studies demonstrating the deleterious and 
disparate impact of segregated educational institutions.  While laudable as efforts by the Court to 
embrace its assigned constitutional duty,102 reliance on scientific evidence presents its own epistemic 
challenges, particularly in regard to the selection and interpretation of evidence.   
This essay has argued that similar concerns drive Justice Scalia and other originalists to 
indulge in historicism in cases where, from an originalist point of view, the question presented deals 
 
99 Ginsburg ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 355. 
100 SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION supra note 45 at 44-47, 146. 
101 Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 at 1192, 1194-98; Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 at 1207 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
Atkins v. Virginia, supra note 2 at 321. 
102 Roper v. Simmons, supra note 1 at 1194-98; Atkins v. Virginia, supra note 2 at 317-21. 
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in objective morality.  They give up too soon.  The epistemic challenges that confront judges in 
these constitutional cases are similar in character to challenges that confront all others who pursue 
the truth.  For example, philosophers of science have long recognized the inherent epistemic 
challenges to objectivity in the sciences that derive from the phenomenal limitations imposed by our 
sensorial nature and our essential subjectivity.  Justice Scalia and others committed to finding the 
true answers to such questions as “What is cruel?” may find some guidance from the work done by 
their fellow travelers in other fields.   
The most persuasive solutions to epistemic challenges in the sciences substitute 
intersubjectivity for objectivity.103 While a full argument for this position is beyond the scope of this 
essay,104 the insight is straightforward.  In the absence of Platonic capacities, the best path to truth is 
through substantive and open exchange with others who have an interest in the answer.  The 
disciplinary effects of the community governed by appropriate rules of exchange result in the best 
approximation of objectivity we can ever achieve. 
Embracing intersubjectivity as objectivity may appear shocking, but it is hardly revolutionary.  
The same intuition underlies democratic politics, justifying truth claims by reference to a discursive 
process that starts in civil society and ends in law and official policy.105 It is frequently applied in the 
overarching structures of legal procedure106 and appears frequently as a response to more fine-
grained problems of evidence.107 It is, then, no surprise that a judge confronted with her 
 
103 See, e.g., DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS PROCESS (1988); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, SCIENCE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 1-64, 
113-139 (1972). 
104 This position is developed more fully in David Gray, “The Proper Care and Feeding of International Law: An 
Epistemic Role for International Law in Constitutional Interpretation,” supra note 10. 
105 See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 96 at 82-193; Jürgen Habermas, On the 
Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy, 3 EUR. J. OF PHIL. 12 (1995); Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative 
Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1 (1994). 
106 For example, this is the fundamental structure of jury deliberations and verdicts.   
107 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 570, 592-93 (1993) (noting the importance of “peer review,” 
“the scrutiny of the scientific community,” and “general acceptance” in the scientific community as standards for 
evaluating the admissibility of expert scientific evidence). 
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constitutional duty to apply the objective moral language of the Eighth Amendment, say, would 
consider the learned views and opinions of others who have engaged the same questions, without 
regard to national borders.  They are, after all “human beings” confronting problems “similar to our 
own.”108 
This, then, is the fundamental core of the originalist’s case for comparativism in cases where 
the question presented implicates objective moral language embedded in the Constitution.   Our 
founders and their audience would, as moral realists, have read these portions of the text as picking 
out objective moral truths.  An originalist who is committed to reading the Constitution for what it 
meant when written must, then, accept the fact that the borders imposed by these portions of the 
document are objective, not historical.  In most cases issues of ethics and morality are left to the 
elected branches under the Constitution.  However, in the few cases where these questions are 
reserved to the courts by the incorporation of moral language into the text, judges cannot revert to 
historicism or hide behind broad claims of democratic theory.  Rather, they must embrace the 
challenge and enforce those moral limitations on the elected branches that are imposed by the 
Constitution itself.  In the absence of oracular insight, this is a task that can only be approached in 
an intersubjective mode by consulting a diversity of opinions and sources.  The opinions of those 
foreign courts which have engaged the same issues have obvious relevance in such a pursuit.  This 
conclusion must not be overstated.  Listening does not entail deference.  Foreign views on cruelty 
and liberty, like those of our founders, should be heard when relevant, but they are only one voice in 
the conversation.  Further, the weight of foreign voices, like those heard from our founders, must be 
 
108 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 2; see also Ginsburg ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 353; O’Scannlain, What Role Should 
Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, supra note 2 at 1907-08; Wald, The Use of International 
Law, supra note 2 at 441-42 (2004); O’Connor, ASIL Address, supra note 2 at 349-50. 
30
measured according to considerations of interest and relevance,109 which are well within the 
wheelhouse of judges and lawyers who make a living from such analyses. 
This essay has argued that the fundamental tenets of originalism commit its adherents to 
refer to foreign law, among other contemporary sources, when engaging a narrow band of 
constitutional questions.  The Constitution contains universalist language that, read for its original 
meaning, refers to objective moral truths.  Without substituting meaning for intention, the originalist 
is bound to read these sections of the document for their objective content.  Accepting that burden 
raises more questions than it answers, of course.  In particular, the pursuit of moral truth presents 
significant epistemic challenges that have pushed Justice Scalia and others to substitute democratic 
theory for originalist orthodoxy.  While this move may have some appeal, it is nevertheless a sleight 
of hand.   
In exposing the trick this essay has certainly raised more questions than it has answered.  
Judges remain to confront the epistemic challenges inherent in attempts to divine the truths that 
surround concepts like “cruelty” and “liberty.”  In addition, allowing unelected judges to engage 
such questions presents significant concerns from a democratic point of view, such as those that 
arise from counter-majoritarian debates.  Engaging foreign sources also raises nettlesome technical, 
but normatively significant questions, relating to, inter alia, weight and relevance that have not been 
adequately elaborated here.110 Finally, by confining itself to originalism, this essay has not had 
occasion to address the diversity of alternative theories of constitutional interpretation that have a 
presence in the judiciary and the halls of academe, each of which present the question of 
transjudicialism in a unique light.  These are all issues left for another day.  The purpose of this essay 
 
109 See Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra at note 2. 
110 Justice Scalia made just this challenge to Justice Breyer in their 2005 debate on this topic.  See Scalia-Breyer Debate, 
supra note 2. 
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is only to cast the present debate over constitutional comparativism in a new light and to set the 
stage for future debate and discussion.   
